

Online Appendices

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v.1

7/30/2014

Updates to follow

Please cite data as:

Uscinski, J. E. and J. M. Parent (2014). *American Conspiracy Theories*. New York, Oxford University Press.

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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics of Eight Categories of Villains by Year in *NYT*

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Range</u>
RIGHT	14%	0-100%
LEFT	11%	0-100%
CAPITALISTS	11%	0-60%
COMMUNISTS	6%	0-50%
GOVERNMENT	13%	0-55%
MEDIA	2%	0-50%
FOREIGN	36%	0-100%
OTHER	7%	0-50%


This table shows the mean percentages and ranges by year for the eight categories of conspiracy talk found in our *NYT* letters to the editor data. RIGHT and LEFT as well as BUSINESS and COMMUNIST are nearly symmetric in terms of the proportion of total conspiratorial allegations each occupy each year (the slightly higher percentages of talk accusing the RIGHT and CAPITALISTS is likely due to the fact that Republicans are president during more years in our timeframe). This table also indicates that there is a great deal of variation over time in terms of who absorbs the breadth of conspiratorial allegations. For example, RIGHT, LEFT, and FOREIGN all have ranges between 0 percent of the accusations and 100 percent of the allegations.

Appendix B. Conspiracy Theories in Eight Categories Measured as Percentages of Total Sample of Letters to Editor in *NYT*

In the main text (Ch. 3 and 6), we examine the categories of conspiracy theory villains as proportions of the total conspiratorial talk each year. This may concern some readers because the proportions could be affected by the total number of conspiracy letters each year: i.e. the proportion of one category could fluctuate greatly even though a relatively stable amount of letters addresses the villains in that category. To show that our findings remain unchanged in different modes of analysis, we show here the eight categories shown as yearly averages of the proportion of each category to the entire sample of letters for each year. As such, the proportions shown here are not dependent upon fluctuations in the other categories of villains.

In Figure B, the striped columns show the averages for all years in the sample. We see that the RIGHT, LEFT, CAPITALIST, and COMMUNIST categories are, again, relatively similar. The black and grey columns compare years when a Republican is president to years when a Democrat is president, respectively. This again tests Hypothesis 1. We see again, strong support for Hypothesis 1. In years that a Republican is president (black columns), RIGHT and CAPITALIST increase while LEFT and COMMUNIST decrease. In years that a Democrat is president (grey columns), RIGHT and CAPITALIST decrease while LEFT and COMMUNIST increase.


Figure B.




Appendix C. Comparison of Elite Conspiracy Theories to Non-Elite Conspiracy Theories in NYT

In C_1 , we divide letters written by elites from those written by non-elites. There are some minor differences between elites and non-elites in terms of the distribution among the eight categories. For example, elites are more concerned with FOREIGN villains and less concerned with villains on the RIGHT than are non-elites. We surmise that some of this variation is due to splitting the sample; overall, the patterns observed within the two groups are similar. E_2 compares elites and non-elites during years when a Republican is president. In both, RIGHT/CAPITALIST increase while LEFT/COMMUNIST decrease. C_3 compares elites and non-elites during years when a Democrat is president. In both, RIGHT/CAPITALIST decrease while LEFT/COMMUNIST increase. Thus, elites and non-elites appear to respond to the political environment in similar fashion—the patterns nearly mirror each other. As such, the main body of the paper combines elites and non-elites to create a more robust measure of conspiracy talk. In future works however, we take a more granular approach by examining the interplay between the two categories.


C_1 . Elites and Non Elites all Years



C₂. Elites and Non Elites during Years Republican is President



C₃. Elites and Non Elites during Years Democrat is President



Appendix D. Analysis of Conspiracy Talk Proffering and Discounting Conspiratorial Allegations

Our coders gathered both letters that argue in favor of a conspiracy theory, and those that recite the alleged plot but argue that the accusations are false. While not indicating that the individual letter writer adheres to the conspiracy theory, these letters indicate that the conspiracy theory is resonating in the population widely enough to merit writing and publishing a letter to discount it.

One would not proclaim that a far-reaching conspiracy to do widespread harm does not exist, unless the accusation had already been made and was gaining some popularity. To name but one high-profile example, in April, 2011 President Barack Obama held a press conference for the sole purpose of releasing his long-form Hawaiian birth certificate. The president did not do this out of the blue, or because he did not have other pressing national problems to address. Rather his press conference was *in response* to the “birther” conspiracy theory which had gained significant traction in the media, and was resonating widely in the public (about a third of the public believed the president may have been born outside of the U.S.). The candidacy of Donald Trump had also brought this issue to the fore. For this reason, letters discounting conspiracy theories are also good indicators of which conspiracy theories are resonating in the public. Therefore in the main text, we combine letters proffering and discounting together into one robust measure of resonance.

But to be complete, we analyze them separately here and show that letters propagating and discounting conspiracy theories follow similar patterns, just as we expect. This further supports our main findings.

Table D₁ shows the average percentage per year for each category of villain. The middle columns include only letters with conspiracy talk alleging or discounting a conspiracy theory. The final column shows the averages for letters alleging and discounting combined. The patterns between the letters alleging and discounting conspiracy theories are very similar.

Table D₁. Average Letters Alleging and Discounting Conspiracy Theories Per Year

	<u>Alleging Conspiracy Theory</u>	<u>Discounting Conspiracy Theory</u>	<u>Total</u>
Right	12%	7%	10%
Left	11%	8%	10%
Capitalist	12%	8%	11%
Communist	7%	10%	8%
Media	1%	4%	2%
Government	12%	13%	12%
Foreign	35%	39%	36%
Other	6%	9%	6%

Table D₂ (below) shows the within category percentages for each type of villain. Only in the case of MEDIA do letters discounting conspiratorial allegations outnumber those alleging a conspiracy (accusations at MEDIA represent only 2% of our total conspiracy talk). Figure D₁ (below), shows the distribution of villains within letters alleging, discounting, and both. We see that the distribution of villains follows the same patterns within letters alleging and discounting, and within all letters with conspiracy talk.

Table D₂. Average Letters Alleging and Discounting Conspiracy Theories within Category

	<u>Alleging Conspiracy Theory</u>	<u>Discounting Conspiracy Theory</u>
Right	81%	18%
Left	78%	21%
Capitalist	77%	22%
Communist	62%	37%
Media	45%	55%
Government	69%	30%
Foreign	67%	32%
Other	58%	41%

Figure D₁. Distribution of Villains within Letters Alleging and Discounting Conspiracy Theory





Figure D₂ (below), tests Hypothesis 1, to see if similar patterns exist over time within letters alleging and discounting conspiracy theories separately. The first three sets of columns show the pattern of conspiracy theories aimed at RIGHT/CAPITALISTS and LEFT/COMMUNISTS during Republican administrations. The next three sets of columns show these patters during Democratic administrations. We find that when isolating letters alleging and discounting conspiracy theories, accusations follow a similar pattern: conspiracy talk aimed at RIGHT/CAPITALISTS increase during Republican administrations while conspiracy talk accusing LEFT/COMMUNISTS increase during Democratic administrations. This provides further support for the main findings of Chapter 6.

Figure D₂ Letters Discounting and Alleging Conspiracy Theory by Party of President



Appendix E. Comparison of Conspiracy Theories in NYT to *Chicago Tribune*

In addition to the sample taken from the *New York Times*, we also constructed a validating sample from the *Chicago Tribune*. We chose the *Tribune* because while the *Times* is caricatured as a liberal, elitist, coastal newspaper, the *Tribune* is caricatured as a more conservative, blue-collar, heartland paper. However, both are considered papers of record. Due both to the high costs of manual coding and the availability of easily searchable and downloadable *Tribune* letters, we took a sample of years from the *Tribune*, equaling ten percent of the *NYT* sample we constructed. Thus, the sample is twelve years (11,489 letters). We choose the years from the *Tribune* based on availability and to get a relatively even number of years from Republican and Democratic presidencies. The years are 1949-1953, 1971-1974, 1986, and 1997-1998 (six years under Republican presidents and six under Democratic presidents). The below figures compare the *NYT* during those years to the *Tribune* during those same years. Because of the small sample size, we present the data similar to the presentation in Appendix D. In addition, because of the peculiarity of these particular years, there are a higher percentage of LEFT/COMMUNIST letters than RIGHT/CAPTIALIST letters, as opposed to the entire 114 year sample from the *NYT* (see Figure E₁). Despite this, these categories remain highly similar between the two papers. During years a Republican is president (E₂), there are more letters accusing RIGHT/CAPTIALIST actors than LEFT/COMMUNIST actors. And, during years a Democrat is president (E₃), there are more letters accusing LEFT/COMMUNIST actors than RIGHT/CAPTIALIST actors. In short, we find that the *Chicago Tribune* sample show similar patterns to the *NYT*, and thus buttress our main findings.

Figure E₁ Twelve Years in Sample




Figure E₂ Six Years under Republican Presidents





Figure E₃ Six Years under Democratic Presidents



Appendix F. Control Variables

We collected a wide range of control variables. We report below a series of models utilizing these. These models support the results shown in Chapter 6 – both in terms of statistical significance, and in terms of substance. Our models show that our findings are robust, even when including a series of controls. We discuss the control variables here, and present and interpret the models in Appendices G and H.

To control for potential biases in letter selection stemming from the *New York Times* staff, we include dummy variables tracking changes in primary ownership and editorship. While the *NYT* has been owned by one family, the principal owner has transferred over time: three dummy variables track this (a fourth is omitted in the models). Ten editors are tracked over time as dummy variables; an eleventh is omitted in the models.

To track changes in the media market and informational environment, we measure the average daily circulation of the *New York Times*, the number of local papers competing with the *Times*, the percentage of households in the U.S. with televisions, and the percentage of households in the U.S. with internet connections. To track if and how stories in the *New York Times* affect the letters to the editor, we include two measures roughly tracking conspiratorial content. We performed a word search in the *NYT Historical Database* for the term “conspiracy”. We surmised that this would provide a rough estimate of how much the readers’ informational environment included discussion of conspiratorial actions and theories. One variable is the percentage of news articles in the paper mentioning the word conspiracy, and another is a variable tracking the percentage of articles on the front page mentioning conspiracy, both in yearly observations tracked over time.

Finally, we collected a series of variables tracking economic and political changes. We include a measure of yearly unemployment and a measure tracking yearly changes in G.D.P. We include a variable tracking presidential election years, and a variable demarking the pre-and post-New Deal period.

We test the variables mentioned above in appendices G and H. In addition to those variables, we also collected and tested a wide range of other variables (not reported here, but intended for use in concurrent research). These measure popular films (number of conspiracy movies each year), television (number of conspiracy television programs each year), stock market crashes, natural and unnatural disasters (e.g. earthquakes), increases in technology, government spending, Congressional polarization, and the passage of salient legislation. The inclusion of these do not affect our substantive results, and as such, they are not included here. We do note however, that we are currently examining these variables in conjunction with the total amount of conspiracy talk each year, and, that the relationship between several variables, including congressional polarization are of particular interest to us.

Appendices G. Models Testing Chapter 6 Domestic

We test the hypothesis that conspiracy theories aimed at the RIGHT and CAPITALISTS will increase in proportion in years when a Republican is president and decrease in proportion when a Democrat is president, and that conspiracy theories aimed at the LEFT and COMMUNISTS will decrease in proportion when a Republican is president and increase in proportion when a Democrat is president. The comparisons in the text fully support this hypothesis. However, we buttress these findings with multivariate models to control for other factors and test the robustness of our results.

The two dependent variables we test are: (1) the proportion of conspiracy theories aimed at the RIGHT and CAPITALISTS, and (2) the proportion of conspiracy theories aimed at the LEFT and COMMUNISTS. These proportions are out of the total amount of conspiracy talk each year. See S.I. C for descriptive statistics. The N is 114; 1897-2010.

We show results of Prais-Winsten regression to account for the fact that because these are time-series data, the models could be plagued by autocorrelation. We do note, however, that the Durbin-Watson statistic, Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test statistic, and Durbin's alternative test all indicate that autocorrelation is not present. Readers should note, that the use of the ols estimator makes interpretation fairly straight forward, however, both of these dependent variables are proportions, and thus bounded between 0 and 1. As such, predicted values could fall outside of the possible range. To remedy this, we also include models with a generalized linear estimator (GLM) to account for the fact that the dependent variable is a proportion. We estimate the GLM with a logit link and the binomial family, along with robust standard errors. Because these are not as readily interpretable as the ols models, we include figures detailing the main effects.

The main independent variable is the party occupying the White House. This is coded as 1=Republican and 0=Democrat. Four Prais-Winsten models are included in table G₁. Two models test the effect of Party of the President on RIGHT/CAPITALIST and two models test the effect of Party of the President on LEFT/COMMUNIST. Models 1 and 3 include no controls, Models 2 and 4 contain the controls mentioned in Appendix F. In models 1 and 2, party of President is statistically significant, substantive, and in the expected direction: Republican control of the White House leads to increased conspiratorial allegations at the RIGHT and CAPITALISTS (and vice-versa). In models 3 and 4, party of President is also statistically significant, substantive, and in the expected direction: Democratic control of the White House leads to increased conspiratorial allegations at the LEFT and COMMUNISTS (and vice-versa).

Table G₂ shows the results of two generalized linear models. Model 1 shows again that the effects of Party of the President remain statistically and substantively significant when the boundedness of the RIGHT/CAPITALIST variable is accounted for. The predicted values from this coefficient are shown in G₃. G₃ shows that when a Democrat is president, the majority of predicted values fall between 0 and 20 percent of the total conspiratorial talk. When a Republican is president, the predicted values of RIGHT/CAPITALIST increase to generally fall between 20 and 60 percent. Model 2 also shows again that the effects of Party of the President remain statistically and substantively significant when predicting LEFT/COMMUNIST. The predicted values from this model are shown in G₄. G₄ shows that when a Democrat is president, the majority of predicted values fall between 15 and 40 percent of the total conspiratorial talk. When a Republican is president, the predicted values of LEFT/COMMUNIST decrease to between 0 and 20 percent. These results buttress the Prais-Winsten models, as well as the more parsimonious comparisons contained in Chapter 6.

Table G₁. Models Testing Hypothesis 1 with Prais-Winsten Regression

	Model #1 RIGHT/CAPITALIST	Model #2 RIGHT/CAPITALIST	Model #3 LEFT/COMMUNIST	Model #4 LEFT/COMMUNIST
Party of President	.195*** (.053)	.218*** (.056)	-.138** (.041)	-.112** (.056)
<i>Primary Owner</i>				
A. H. Sulzberger		-.121 (.177)		.245 (.173)
A. O. Sulzberger		.155 (.176)		.163 (.170)
A. Sulzberger		.181 (.203)		-.076 (.198)
<i>Editor</i>				
R. Ogden		-.011 (.105)		-.051 (.105)
E. James		.008 (.182)		-.421** (.183)
T. Catledge		-.143 (.305)		-.388 (.303)
J. Reston		-.246 (.370)		-.477 (.366)
Vacant		-.386 (.360)		-.258 (.357)
A. M. Rosenthal		-.209 (.356)		-.368 (.354)
M. Frankel		-.101 (.381)		-.293 (.379)
J. Lelleyeld		.601 (.421)		-.248 (.417)
H. Raines		.986 (.510)		-.505 (.502)
B. Keller		.980 (.509)		-.390 (.503)
<i>Media Market</i>				
NYT Circulation		.000 (.001)		.000 (.001)
NYT Conspiracy Mentions		28.9** (14.2)		-15.5 (13.8)
NYT Front Page Conspiracy Mentions		-1.52 (3.44)		.691 (3.36)
Local Competitors		-.012 (.032)		-.031 (.031)
TV Households		.001 (.004)		-.001 (.004)
Internet Households		-.014** (.005)		-.006 (.005)
<i>Economics and Politics</i>				
Unemployment		-.001 (.007)		-.003 (.007)
GDP		-.004 (.003)		-.003 (.003)
Election Years		.003 (.048)		-.007 (.045)
New Deal Realignment		.181 (.179)		-.112 (.178)
Constant	.132** (.042)	.367 (.543)	.245*** (.031)	.822 (.536)
r-squared	.11	.55	.09	.32
N	114	114	114	114


* = $p \leq .10$; ** = $p \leq .05$; *** = $p \leq .01$ based upon two-tailed tests.

G₂. Models Testing Hypothesis 1 with GLM


	Model #1	Model #2
	RIGHT/CAPITALIST	LEFT/COMMUNIST
Party of President	1.23** (0.45)	-0.95* (0.51)
<i>Primary Owner</i>		
A. H. Sulzberger	-1.44 (1.13)	0.99 (0.82)
A. O. Sulzberger	0.82 (0.88)	0.20 (1.22)
A. Sulzberger	0.83 (0.64)	-13.97*** (1.47)
<i>Editor</i>		
R. Ogden	0.03 (0.61)	-0.26 (0.72)
E. James	-0.30 (1.24)	-1.87** (0.81)
T. Catledge	-1.52 (3.59)	-1.73 (1.87)
J. Reston	-2.34 (4.05)	-2.66 (2.13)
Vacant	-2.57 (4.12)	-0.66 (2.29)
A. M. Rosenthal	-1.63 (4.40)	-1.77 (2.17)
M. Frankel	-0.92 (4.49)	-1.04 (2.48)
J. Lelleyeld	2.57 (4.67)	11.78*** (2.66)
H. Raines	3.94 (4.85)	-2.53 (3.11)
B. Keller	3.95 (4.74)	-10.8*** (2.99)
<i>Media Market</i>		
NYT Circulation	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
NYT Conspiracy Mentions	147.0 (109.6)	-104.9 (107.6)
NYT Front Page Conspiracy Mentions	-7.89 (27.4)	-0.83 (24.9)
Local Competitors	-0.10 (0.18)	-0.25 (0.19)
TV Households	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.26)
Internet Households	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)
<i>Economics and Politics</i>		
Unemployment	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
GDP	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Election Years	0.04 (0.34)	-0.04 (0.35)
New Deal Realignment	0.89 (0.71)	0.27 (0.95)
Constant	-0.03 (3.28)	3.45 (3.48)
Log Psuedo-likelihood	-38.8	-35.5
N	114	114

*= p≤.10; **=p≤.05; ***=p≤.01 based upon two-tailed tests.

G₃. Predicted Values of RIGHT/CAPITALIST



G₄. Predicted Values of LEFT/COMMUNIST



Appendix H. Descriptive Evidence Examining Effect of Congress and Court

We operationalize the domestic distribution of power using the president's party affiliation because the presidency is the most visible, unified, and powerful institution in government. Thus, the presidency provides the best measure of the domestic distribution of power. One might expect other powerful institutions to also exhibit an effect, albeit lesser, on conspiracy talk. For example, the party controlling Congress exerts considerable control over the distribution of resources. But, given that Congress is less visible and unified than the presidency, we do not expect Congress to significantly affect conspiracy talk. This same logic applies to the Court—the Court's party affiliation/ideology is less discernible to the public than the president's, and also the Court as an institution is less visible. But, to be complete, we examine the effects of Congress and the Court. We find some descriptive and anecdotal evidence suggesting that both Congress and the Court affect the balance of conspiracy talk. However, and as expected, the effects of the party affiliation of Congress and the ideology of the Court are not statistically significant predictors of conspiracy talk.

Let's begin by looking at control of Congress. During unified government, we might expect the party in power to attract a greater proportion of conspiratorial allegations because it would exert a majority of the control. Thus, the difference between the proportion of accusations aimed at RIGHT/CAPITALISTS and the proportion of accusations aimed at LEFT/COMMUNISTS should be fairly wide. During divided government, on the other hand, we might expect the proportion of accusations aimed at RIGHT/CAPITALISTS and the proportion of accusations aimed at LEFT/COMMUNISTS to be more equitable.

A few anecdotes from the data suggest this. Consider recent years when Congressional majorities changed hands. In 1994, the Republicans won a majority in the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years; Democrat Bill Clinton was president. In 1994 when the Democrats controlled the White House and both houses, accusations of conspiracy against RIGHT/CAPITALISTS were eighteen percent of the conspiracy talk. After the Republicans entered office, accusations against RIGHT/CAPITALISTS increased to forty-three percent of the conspiracy talk in 1995. When the 2006 election changed the House from Republican to Democratic control during Republican George W. Bush's second term, accusations of conspiracy against RIGHT/CAPITALISTS dropped from one hundred percent of the conspiracy talk in 2006 to zero percent of the conspiracy talk in 2007. Figures H₁ and H₂, demonstrate this over the course of the data.

During years when a Republican is president (Fig. H₁), united government shows a difference of 29 percentage points between RIGHT/CAPITALISTS and LEFT/COMMUNIST; during divided government the difference drops to 15 percentage points (RIGHT/CAPITALISTS decrease by 10 percentage points while LEFT/COMMUNISTS increase by 2.6 percentage points). During years when a Democrat is president (Fig. H₂), united government shows a difference of 21 percentage points between RIGHT/CAPITALIST and LEFT/COMMUNIST; during divided government the difference drops to zero (accusations against RIGHT/CAPITALISTS increase by 8 percentage points while accusations against LEFT/COMMUNISTS decrease by 12 percentage points). However, while these descriptive changes are of interest, they do not meet traditional standards of statistical significance.

Figure H₁ . Proportion of Villains during Divided and Unified Government (Republican President)





Figure H₂. Proportion of Villains during Divided and Unified Government (Democratic President)



What about the balance of power on the Supreme Court? For several reasons, we expect the Court to have even less effect on conspiracy talk. One reason is that the court is the least powerful branch and badly positioned to allocate resources. Another reason is that the Court is viewed less as a political institution and more as a long-term legal institution, above the fray of partisan advantage and current policies. Nevertheless, we check our perspective against the best available evidence.

Let's begin with one telling anecdote. Franklin Roosevelt's 1937 court-packing plan, often viewed as an executive branch power grab, would have given the Democrats control over all branches of government. The Democrats at that time controlled the White House, and had large majorities in both houses of Congress. In response to the unveiling of F.D.R.'s plan, conspiracy theories aimed at the LEFT increased to 50 percent of the conspiracy talk in the data for that year—this was the largest amount of conspiracy theories aimed at the LEFT during Roosevelt's entire time in office. Letters contended that Roosevelt was attempting to set up a dictatorship with control over all of government and business. For example, letters alleging a conspiracy against Roosevelt drew upon the Court-packing plan as evidence. One letter dated February 10, 1937 stated, "If the President has his way and is permitted to emasculate the Court, the United States may class itself as a nation of puppets." On September 10th, 1937, a writer claimed that while the president "declares for democracy," he in fact uses the "methods of a dictator." Another letter, dated October 30, 1937 claimed the Roosevelt was setting up a "political oligarchy." This episode suggests that attempts to control the Court are met with allegations of conspiracy.

How about a more systematic test? Unlike the presidency and Congress where party control is straight-forward and easy to measure, the party affiliation/ideology of the Court is less so. So to do this, we use a numerical score that tracks the ideology of the median justice on the Court (see Martin and Quinn 2002 for the derivation of these scores. Negative values indicate a more liberal Court while positive values indicate a more conservative Court.) Correlation coefficients between the ideology of the median Supreme Court Justice and the percentage of RIGHT, LEFT, CAPITALIST, and COMMUNIST conspiracy theories each year indicate a minor, but correctly signed effect. All four correlations are in the expected direction, ranging between -.25 and .13. For example, the correlation between the Court median and the percentage of LEFT conspiracies each year is -.25 indicating that as the COURT becomes more liberal, there is a slightly higher percentage of letters accusing the left of conspiring. This is also true with RIGHT conspiracy letters: as the median justice of the Court become more conservative, letters contain slightly more conspiracy talk accusing the right of conspiring (a coefficient of .11). However, while these simple tests are telling, as expected, the effect of the Court does not meet traditional standards of significance when met with further scrutiny.

Appendix I. Models Testing Chapter 6 Foreign

We now subject these results from Chapter 6 to multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is the amount of FOREIGN conspiracy letters as a proportion of the total conspiratorial letters each year. The N is again 114. Model 1 is a Prais-Winsten model with no controls. Model 2 is a Prais-Winsten model with controls. Model 3 is a generalized linear model with controls.

The primary independent variable is great power conflicts; this includes declared wars and the Cold War. In the main text, FOREIGN conspiracy letters increased in proportion by 17 percentage points during these times.

We include a measure of the highest level of conflict as measured by the Militarized Interstate Dispute database. In addition we include a measure of other large-scale wars not captured by the Great Power Wars variable. Party of the President is also included.

The three models buttress the parsimonious comparison from the main text: great power conflicts lead to an increased proportion of FOREIGN conspiracy theorizing. Other types of dispute have no or little effect. Other wars do have a negative impact in Model 3 (but not in Models 1 or 2), however this effect is fairly minor, and also somewhat expected. We expect smaller foreign conflicts to either increase or not affect infighting because they do not pose the type of external threat needed to quell infighting. In addition, these less threatening wars can increase domestic conspiracy theories. Because the enemies in these wars are not that threatening to the U.S., people are less concerned with how these foreign actors are operating than how domestic political actors are addressing the war. With this said, this is subject of concurrent work.


I_2 shows the predicted values of the proportion of FOREIGN from Model 3 given our Great Power Wars variable. In the absence of a declared war or the Cold War, values range mostly between 10 and 45 percent. Predicted values during declared wars and the Cold War range mostly between 40 and 60 percent. This, again, supports the main findings.

I. Models Testing Effect of Foreign Threat on Foreign Conspiracy Theories

	Model #1	Model #2	Model #3
Great Power Wars	0.22*** (0.05)	0.29** (0.11)	1.11** (0.37)
MIDS Level	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Other Wars	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.58* (0.31)
Party of President	-0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	0.21 (0.29)
<i>Primary Owner</i>			
A. H. Sulzberger		-0.21 (0.19)	-1.06 (0.80)
A. O. Sulzberger		-0.24 (0.19)	-1.17 (0.87)
A. Sulzberger		0.21 (0.25)	0.61 (0.73)
<i>Editor</i>			
R. Ogden		-0.03 (0.12)	-0.19 (0.57)
E. James		0.30 (0.19)	0.34 (0.72)
T. Catledge		0.09 (0.33)	0.71 (1.21)
J. Reston		-0.22 (0.41)	-0.57 (1.40)
Vacant		-0.26 (0.40)	-1.34 (1.61)
A. M. Rosenthal		-0.07 (0.37)	-0.04 (1.53)
M. Frankel		-0.96 (0.40)	-0.35 (1.68)
J. Leliveld		-0.79* (0.44)	-3.47 (2.59)
H. Raines		-0.92* (0.54)	-4.33 (3.38)
B. Keller		-1.09** (0.53)	-5.46 (3.84)
<i>Media Market</i>			
NYT Circulation		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
NYT Conspiracy Mentions		-8.67 (15.2)	-32.7 (78.9)
NYT Front Page Conspiracy Mentions		-1.02 (3.97)	14.1 (18.24)
Local Competitors		-0.03 (0.035)	-1.64 (1.49)
TV Households		0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Internet Households		0.009* (0.005)	0.05 (0.05)
<i>Economics and Politics</i>			
Unemployment		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)
GDP		-0.00 (0.003)	0.00 (0.01)
Election Years		-0.003 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.025)
New Deal Realignment		-0.07 (0.19)	-0.51 (0.68)
Constant		0.70 (0.59)	1.28 (2.66)
r-square	.21	.57	
N	114	114	114

*= p≤.10; **=p≤.05; ***=p≤.01 based upon two-tailed tests.

I₂. Predicted Values of FOREIGN



Appendix J. Control Variables for Chapter 4 Models

The following models relate to content presented in Chapter 4. We used the control variables of family income (faminc), education (educ), gender (gender), white racial identification (white), and party identification (pid7), as well as our predispositions to conspiratorial beliefs measure (conspire). The following is an explanation of each of these variables. Respondents are weighted to approximate population demographics.

FAMILY INCOME is measured as an ordinal variable, with 16 categories consisting of typical income ranges. The lowest category is “Less than \$10,000,” while the top two categories are “\$350,000-\$499,999” and “\$500,000 or more.”

EDUCATION is measured as an ordinal variable, with the following categories: No High School Diploma, High School Graduate, Some College, 2-Year College Degree, 4-Year College Degree, and Post-Graduate Degree.

GENDER is measured as a dummy variable, where 1 indicates female and 0 indicates male.

WHITE is measured as a dummy variable, where 1 indicates white identification and 0 indicates otherwise.

PARTY ID is measured on a 7-point scale, where 1 indicates “Strong Democrat,” 4 indicates “Independent,” and 7 indicates “Strong Republican.”

The CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS measure is a product of principle component factor analysis, combining the responses to three questions asked that would indicate predispositions towards conspiracy theorizing. The higher the measure, the more predisposed the respondent is to believe in conspiracy theories. The measure ranges from -2.34 to 2.34.

Appendix K.

Table K₁ refers to footnote 10 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on trust in government.

Government trust is measured on a 5-point scale based on responses to the prompt, “The government can be trusted most of the time.” A response of “Strongly agree” is recorded as a 1, “Neither agree nor disagree” as a 3, and “Strongly disagree” as a 5. Therefore, higher values of the dependent variable indicate less trust in government.

We notice that PARTY ID and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS are highly statistically significant in both models. Substantively, PARTY ID and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS also provide the largest effect. Going from one side of the political spectrum to the other can shift a respondent’s trust in government from on the fence to very distrustful, and the difference between the lowest and highest measure of conspiracy theorizing spans over half of the dependent variable’s range.

K₁: Effects of Notable Variables on Trust in Government

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	-.04 (.02)	-.02 (.01)
EDUCATION	-.07 (.04)	-.04* (.02)
GENDER	-.20 (.09)	-.08 (.06)
WHITE	.16 (.14)	.11 (.07)
PARTY ID	.27*** (.03)	.13*** (.01)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	.73*** (.07)	.34*** (.03)
CONSTANT		3.11*** (.14)
R-squared		.22
Pseudo R-squared	.09	
N=	972	972

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Appendix L. Big Events Controlled by Small Groups and Conspiratorial Predispositions

Table L₁ refers to footnote 11 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on the belief that small, powerful groups control much of the world.

This belief is measured on a 5-point scale based on responses to the prompt: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Big events like wars, the current recession, and the outcomes of elections are controlled by small groups of people who are working in secret against the rest of us.” A response of “Strongly agree” is recorded as a 1, “Neither agree nor disagree” as a 3, and “Strongly disagree” as a 5. Therefore, lower values of the dependent variable indicate more belief in this claim.

We notice that most of the independent variables in the ordered logit model have statistically significant coefficients, with FAMILY INCOME and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS being highly statistically significant. Substantively, FAMILY INCOME and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS also provide the largest effect. In the OLS regression, every single point increase in a respondent’s CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS measure is expected to drive the response roughly one answer closer towards agreement. Conversely, moving up the FAMILY INCOME ladder is expected to drive a response closer towards disagreement, although not to the same degree.

Table L₁: Effects of Notable Variables on Belief in Small Powerful Groups

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	.07*** (.02)	.04*** (.01)
EDUCATION	.03 (.04)	.02 (.02)
GENDER	.27* (.12)	.11 (.06)
WHITE	.31* (.14)	.13 (.07)
PARTY ID	.02 (.03)	.00 (.01)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	-1.22*** (.07)	-.57*** (.03)
CONSTANT		2.50*** (.14)
R-squared		.32
Pseudo R-squared	.13	
N=	977	969

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Table L₂ refers to footnote 12 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on the number of conspiratorial groups named when asked.

The dependent variable is measured based on responses to the prompt, “Which of these groups are likely to work in secret against the rest of us? Please check all that apply.” We then counted the number of groups that each respondent named.

We notice that three of the independent variables in the models have highly statistically significant coefficients in both models. Substantively, CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS provides the largest effect. Females are likely to name slightly less names than males, while Republicans are expected to name roughly one more name than Democrats. CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS, however, is the only variable that is expected to shift responses more than 1 more name. Controlling for the other variables, a highly conspiratorial respondent is expected to name about 2.5 more names than the least conspiratorial respondents.

Table L₂: Effects of Notable Variables on Number of Groups Named

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	-.03 (.02)	-.03 (.02)
EDUCATION	-.06 (.04)	-.03 (.04)
GENDER	-.38** (.11)	-.46*** (.13)
WHITE	.12 (.14)	.10 (.15)
PARTY ID	.21*** (.03)	.22*** (.03)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	.64*** (.06)	.67*** (.06)
CONSTANT		2.36*** (.29)
R-squared		.17
Pseudo R-squared	.05	
N=	980	977

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Appendix M: Race and Conspiratorial Predispositions

Tables M₁ and M₂ refer to footnote 15 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of race on our CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS measure.

The CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS measure is a product of principle component factor analysis, combining the responses to three questions asked that would indicate predispositions towards conspiracy theorizing. The higher the measure, the more predisposed the respondent is to believe in conspiracy theories. The measure ranges from -2.34 to 2.34.

The WHITE, BLACK, and HISPANIC variables are dummy variables indicating if the respondent identifies with each respective race or ethnicity. In this survey, respondents were asked to choose only one of these groups; a respondent could not respond that they identify as both white and Hispanic, for instance.

When running the basic OLS and ordered logit models, we run across issues of multicollinearity. We believe that there are complex factors affecting the relationship between race and conspiratorial predispositions, and will be adding to this appendix in the future. For now, what we do note is a difference in the distributions on the CONSPIRACY PREDISPOSITIONS measure by race as discussed in the text, as well as the statistically significant differences between the means of the three groups.

Table M₁: Summary of C. PREDISPOSITIONS Measure for Respondents

Group	Mean	Standard Deviation
WHITE	0.05	1.04
BLACK	0.14	0.80
HISPANIC	0.21	0.83

Appendix N: The Iraq War and Conspiratorial Predispositions

Table N₁ refers to footnotes 40 and 42 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on attitudes towards the Iraq War.

Attitudes towards the Iraq War were measured based on responses to the prompt, “All things considered do you think it was a mistake to invade Iraq?”. A response of “Yes” is recorded as a 1, “No” as a 2, and “Strongly disagree” as a 3. Therefore, lower values of the dependent variable indicate more support for the statement.

We notice that most of the independent variables in the models have statistically significant coefficients, with PARTY ID and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS being highly statistically significant. Substantively, PARTY ID and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS also provide the largest effect. Going from one side of the political spectrum to the other can shift a respondent’s belief almost completely, and the difference between the lowest and highest measure of conspiracy theorizing spans a similar share of the range. The more Democrat, and the more conspiratorial a respondent, the more likely they are to say Iraq was a mistake.

Table N₁: Effects of Notable Variables on Attitudes towards Iraq War

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	-.06** (.02)	-.02* (.01)
EDUCATION	-.09* (.05)	-.04* (.02)
GENDER	.00 (.13)	-.01 (.05)
WHITE	-.03 (.16)	-.03 (.06)
PARTY ID	.40*** (.03)	.18*** (.01)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	-.39*** (.07)	-.15*** (.03)
CONSTANT		1.47*** (.12)
R-squared		.20
Pseudo R-squared	.10	
N=	979	976

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Appendix O: Political Participation and Conspiratorial Predispositions

Table O₁ refers to footnote 43 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on reported voting in the 2012 election.

Voting in the 2012 election is measured based on responses to the prompt, “Which of the following statements best describes you?”. The options were “I definitely voted in the General Election on November”, as well as four options indicating reasons for not having voted. We tallied those four options as a “0” response, and the affirmative option as a “1” response.

We notice that EDUCATION and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS have statistically significant coefficients in both models. Substantively, EDUCATION and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS also provide the largest effects. EDUCATION is expected, as it has been shown in previous studies to increase civic participation. CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS, however, does show a similar effect in the opposite direction, driving down voting.

Table O₁: Effects of Notable Variables on Reported Voting in 2012 Election

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	.10 (.06)	.00 (.00)
EDUCATION	.41** (.12)	.02** (.01)
GENDER	-.03 (.30)	.00 (.02)
WHITE	.19 (.37)	.01 (.03)
PARTY ID	.00 (.08)	-.00 (.00)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	-.63*** (.18)	-.03** (.01)
CONSTANT		.82*** (.04)
R-squared		.05
Pseudo R-squared	.11	
N=	775	710

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Table O₂ refers to footnote 43 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on voter registration.

Voter registration is measured based on responses to the prompt, “Are you registered to vote?” A response of “Yes” is recorded as a 1, and “No” as a 2.

We notice that most of the independent variables in the models have statistically significant coefficients across both models. Substantively, FAMILY INCOME, EDUCATION, and GENDER provide large effects that are expected, given other works on factors that affect voter registration. However, CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS provides a similar effect, in the opposite direction as FAMILY INCOME and EDUCATION (it drives registration down.)

Table O₂: Effects of Notable Variables on Voter Registration

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	-.15*** (.03)	-.02*** (.00)
EDUCATION	-.39*** (.06)	-.05*** (.01)
GENDER	.54** (.17)	.08** (.03)
WHITE	-.15 (.19)	-.02 (.03)
PARTY ID	-.03 (.04)	-.00 (.01)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	.35*** (.09)	.05*** (.01)
CONSTANT		1.41*** (.06)
R-squared		.12
Pseudo R-squared	.13	
N=	974	967

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Table O₃ refers to footnote 44 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on political donations.

Political donations are measured based on responses to a prompt asking whether the respondent had “Donate[ed] money to a candidate, campaign, or political organization.” A response of “Yes” is recorded as a 1, and “No” as a 2.

We notice that FAMILY INCOME, EDUCATION, and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS are highly statistically significant in both models. Substantively, FAMILY INCOME and EDUCATION drive donations up, while the CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS variable drives donations down. The largest effects are EDUCATION and FAMILY INCOME.

Table O₃: Effects of Notable Variables on Political Donations

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	-.08** (.03)	-.01** (.00)
EDUCATION	-.40*** (.06)	-.06*** (.01)
GENDER	.22 (.18)	.03 (.03)
WHITE	-.39 (.25)	-.06 (.03)
PARTY ID	.03 (.04)	.00 (.01)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	.28** (.09)	.04** (.01)
CONSTANT		2.05*** (.10)
R-squared		.13
Pseudo R-squared	.12	
N=	819	837

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Appendix P: Violence and Conspiratorial Predispositions

Table P₁ refers to footnote 47 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on attitudes toward violence against the government.

Attitudes toward violence against the government are measured on a 5-point scale based on responses to the prompt, “Violence is sometimes an acceptable way for Americans to express their disagreement with the government.” A response of “Strongly agree” is recorded as a 1, “Neither agree nor disagree” as a 3, and “Strongly disagree” as a 5. Therefore, lower values of the dependent variable indicate more acceptance of violence against the government.

We notice that most of the independent variables in the models have statistically significant coefficients, with FAMILY INCOME and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS being highly statistically significant. Substantively, CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS provides the largest effect, driving attitudes towards violence up at a rate larger than FAMILY INCOME can drive it down.

Table P₁: Effects of Notable Variables on Violence Against the Government

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	.08*** (.02)	.04** (.01)
EDUCATION	-.08 (.04)	-.04 (.02)
GENDER	.40** (.12)	.21** (.07)
WHITE	-.09 (.15)	-.06 (.08)
PARTY ID	-.07* (.03)	-.04* (.02)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	-.33*** (.06)	-.17*** (.03)
CONSTANT		3.61*** (.15)
R-squared		.06
Pseudo R-squared	.03	
N=	964	955

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Table P₂ refers to footnote 48 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on attitudes toward violence against extreme groups.

Attitudes toward violence against the government are measured on a 5-point scale based on responses to the prompt, “Violence is an acceptable way for Americans to stop politically extreme groups in our country from doing harm to the rest of us.” A response of “Strongly agree” is recorded as a 1, “Neither agree nor disagree” as a 3, and “Strongly disagree” as a 5. Therefore, lower values of the dependent variable indicate more acceptance of violence against extreme groups.

We notice that FAMILY INCOME, GENDER, and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS have statistically significant coefficients in both models. Substantively, FAMILY INCOME and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS provide the largest effects, and in the opposite directions of one another. Larger values for FAMILY INCOME drive down attitudes in favor of violence, while larger values for our CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS measure drive up these attitudes, albeit having somewhat less of an effect. GENDER is expected to have the demonstrated effect based on previous studies regarding gender and violence.

Table P₂: Effects of Notable Variables on Violence Against Extreme Groups

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	.10*** (.02)	.06*** (.01)
EDUCATION	.08 (.04)	.04 (.02)
GENDER	.34** (.12)	.20** (.07)
WHITE	-.18 (.14)	.11 (.08)
PARTY ID	-.00 (.03)	-.01 (.02)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	-.15* (.06)	-.09*** (.03)
CONSTANT		2.75*** (.16)
R-squared		.06
Pseudo R-squared	.03	
N=	965	961

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Appendix Q: Gun Restrictions and Conspiratorial Predispositions

Table Q₁ refers to footnote 50 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on attitudes toward gun restrictions.

Attitudes toward gun restrictions are measured on a 3-point scale based on responses to a standard prompt gauging gun control views. A response of “More strict [gun control]” is recorded as a 1, “Keep as they are” as a 2, and “Less strict” as a 3. Therefore, higher values of the dependent variable indicate less desire for gun control.

We notice that most of the independent variables in the models have statistically significant coefficients, with GENDER, PARTY ID, and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS being highly statistically significant. Substantively, PARTY ID provides the largest effect, as is to be expected from a polarized political issue. Perhaps surprisingly, however, is the substantial effect that CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS provides. Individuals low on this measure are slightly more distant from individuals high on the measure than males are to females, which is another well-documented factor in gun control attitudes.

Table Q₁: Effects of Notable Variables on Attitudes Towards Gun Control

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	-.05* (.02)	-.02** (.01)
EDUCATION	.04 (.05)	.02 (.01)
GENDER	-.90*** (.13)	-.27*** (.04)
WHITE	-.13 (.16)	-.03 (.05)
PARTY ID	.44*** (.04)	.14*** (.01)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	.24*** (.07)	.07** (.02)
CONSTANT		1.64*** (.09)
R-squared		.24
Pseudo R-squared	.14	
N=	977	975

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Appendix R: Civic Talk and Conspiratorial Predispositions

Table R₁ refers to footnote 51 in Chapter 4. In this model, we test the effect of the six independent variables on the number of individuals respondents share important matters with.

The dependent variable is measured on based on responses to the prompt, “From time to time, most people discuss important matters with other people. How many people have you discussed important matters with in the last month?” Respondents were free to answer with any number. After calculating Cook’s D values, we identified 4 influential outliers. As a result, the data was capped at 300 to remove bias from these 4 observations.

We notice that EDUCATION, GENDER, and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS have statistically significant coefficients in this model. Substantively, EDUCATION provides the largest effect. CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS does hold a fairly large effect on its own; When holding all other variables constant, an individual can lose as many as 10 people on this count from a high value to a low of CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS.

Table R₁: Effects of Notable Variables on Sharing Important Matters with Others

	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	-.28 (.33)
EDUCATION	3.40*** (.68)
GENDER	-5.38** (1.93)
WHITE	4.37 (2.33)
PARTY ID	.14 (.49)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	-2.16* (.98)
CONSTANT	6.81 (4.38)
R-squared	.05
N=	952

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Appendix S: Financial Success and Conspiratorial Predispositions

Tables S₁ and S₂ refer to footnote 52 in Chapter 4. In these models, we test the effect of the six independent variables on income and stock ownership.

FAMILY INCOME is measured as an ordinal variable, with 16 categories consisting of typical income ranges. The lowest category is “Less than \$10,000,” while the top two categories are “\$350,000-\$499,999” and “\$500,000 or more.”

We notice that EDUCATION and CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS seem to be the variables of most note here. EDUCATION makes perfect logical sense for substantially affecting income, but it is interesting that CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS seems to have an effect about half as large in the opposite direct.

Table S₁: Effects of Notable Variables on Income

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
EDUCATION	.43*** (.04)	.71*** (.06)
GENDER	-.20 (.11)	-.34 (.19)
WHITE	.16 (.14)	.40 (.23)
PARTY ID	.06* (.03)	.07 (.05)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	-.22*** (.06)	-.37*** (.09)
CONSTANT		3.39*** (.42)
R-squared		.16
Pseudo R-squared	.04	
N=	980	977

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

Stock Ownership is measured based on responses to the prompt, “Do you own [stocks]?” A response of “Yes” is recorded as a 1, and “No” as a 2.

We notice that most of the independent variables in the models have highly statistically significant coefficients. Substantively, FAMILY INCOME and EDUCATION provide the largest effect, which is to be expected. Based on this model, CONSPIRACY PREDISPOSITIONS does have a statistically significant effect on stock ownership, controlling for these demographic factors.

Table S₂: Effects of Notable Variables on Stock Ownership

	Ordered Logit	OLS Regression
FAMILY INCOME	-.25*** (.03)	-.05*** (.00)
EDUCATION	-.36*** (.05)	-.07*** (.01)
GENDER	.30 (.16)	.05 (.03)
WHITE	-.67** (.20)	-.11** (.03)
PARTY ID	-.14*** (.04)	-.02** (.01)
CONSPIRATORIAL PREDISPOSITIONS	.24** (.08)	.04** (.01)
CONSTANT		2.20*** (.06)
R-squared		.27
Pseudo R-squared	.22	
N=	971	966

* p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001